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Introduction
Fault trees were first developed in the 1960s and are commonly used for the qualitative and quantitative analyses of causes of system failure. The analysis of complex industrial systems may produce thousands of combinations of events (minimal cutsets/prime implicants) which can cause system failure. The determination of these failure combinations can be a time-consuming process even on modern high speed digital computers. If the fault tree has many failure modes, the determination of the exact top event probability also requires lengthy calculations. For many complex fault trees this requirement may be beyond the capability of the available computers.
Thus, approximation techniques have had to be introduced which resulted in loss of accuracy.
A more convenient form for the logic function from the mathematical viewpoint is that of a Binary Decision Diagram [1] . It overcomes some disadvantages of conventional FTA techniques enabling efficient and exact qualitative and quantitative analyses of both coherent and non-coherent fault trees. The BDD method is efficient for quantifying the system failure likelihood since it does not need the system failure modes as an intermediate step. It is also more accurate as there is no need for the approximations used in the traditional approach of kinetic tree theory [2] . The efficiency and the accuracy of the BDD method is discussed in [3, 4] .
Rather than analysing the fault tree directly the BDD method first converts the fault tree to a binary decision diagram, which represents the Boolean Equation for the top event. The resulting SFBDD can be used in the quantitative analysis, calculating the top event probability or frequency.
An SFBDD does not provide all the information for the qualitative analysis, since not all the implicant sets of a non-coherent fault tree are necessarily prime and the list may not be complete. This means that it requires more than just a minimisation, as in the coherent case, to produce a full list of prime implicants. The full list can be obtained by applying the consensus theorem [5] to pairs of prime implicant sets involving a normal and negated literal. The first approach to this was presented by Courdet and Madre [6] and further developed by Dutuit and Rauzy [7] where a metaproducts BDD is formed. Every basic event is represented by two variables, P x and S x , where the first of them represents the relevancy of the component (relevant or irrelevant) and the second variable represents the type of the relevancy (failure relevant or repair relevant). Since a meta-products BDD is in its minimal form, traversing its branches gives all the prime implicant sets.
The second alternative method presented by Rauzy [9] uses the system SFBDD and converts it to the zero-suppressed BDD (ZBDD), presented by Minato [10] . The method requires to label nodes with failed and/or working states of basic events and to decompose prime implicant sets according to the presence of a given state of a basic event. The resulting ZBDD is in its minimal form and traversing its paths from the root vertex to terminal vertex 1 results in all prime implicant sets.
The third alternative method investigated produces a labelled binary decision diagram (L-BDD), presented by Contini in [11] where every basic event is labelled according to its type. The additional information about the occurrence of every basic event is considered at an early stage of the algorithm, i.e. while converting a fault tree to an L-BDD. An L-BDD has two branches, therefore, it does not provide all prime implicant sets. The L-BDD obtained from the fault tree is simplified and then the determination of prime implicant sets is performed where the rules of the calculation depend on the type of a basic event. The L-BDD resulting is minimised.
The new alternative method for performing the qualitative analysis for non-coherent fault trees is presented in this paper where a fault tree is converted to a ternary decision diagram (TDD). The main concept of a TDD was presented by Sasao [8] , which is expanded into an implementation methodology for fault tree analysis in this paper. A TDD has three branches leaving any variable: the 1 branch represents the failure relevance of the component, the 0 branch represents the repair relevance of the component (so far this is a conventional BDD presentation) and the consensus branch represents the irrelevance of the component. A TDD encodes all the prime implicant sets, since while calculating the consensus branch for every node the consensus theorem is applied and all "hidden" prime implicant sets are obtained. However, the TDD can be non-minimal, therefore, the minimisation process needs to be performed removing the non-minimal paths from the 1 and 0 branches. Then the prime implicant sets can be obtained. Also, the obtained TDD can be used for the quantitative analysis as well as the qualitative analysis, therefore, no additional BDDs are required.
The four methods are described in the following sections and demonstrated throughout with the use of an example. Their efficiency is investigated using a library of large example fault trees.
Non-coherent fault trees
Fault tree structures can be classified according to their underlying logic. If during fault tree construction the failure logic is restricted to the use of the AND gate and the OR gate, the resulting fault tree is called coherent. If NOT logic is used or directly implied (by for example the use of exclusive OR, XOR, gates) the resulting fault tree can be non-coherent.
Define each component in the system according to an indicator x i to show its status:
, n is the number of components in the system.
The fault tree diagram represents a logic structure which can be expressed by a structure function  :
According to the requirements of coherency [5] , a structure function  (x) is coherent if:
where
). ,
The second of these conditions means that as the component deteriorates (x fails, so x i = 1) the system condition either does not change or also deteriorates. If the system is non-coherent for component i then for some state of the remaining components the system is failed then component i works and then when i fails the system is restored to the functioning (non-failed) condition. For example, system failure might occur due to the recovery of a failed component. Alternatively, during system failure, the failure of an additional component may bring the system to a good state. The fault tree is coherent if the NOT logic can be eliminated from the fault tree.
Consider an example of the leak detection system shown in Figure 1 .
Figure 1. Leak protection system
A very high pressure gas is flowing as part of a gas transport system. If a leak (L) occurs on the section after the isolation valve (VAL), a gas detection system closes the valve. This stops a build up of the gas concentration in a location where an ignition source (I1) is possible. If the valve works and isolation occurs the high pressure gas can cause a rupture of the pipe and a second leak prior to the isolation valve. There is a permanent ignition source (I2) in this area, therefore, the problem can be avoided by a pressure relief valve (PRV) diverting the gas flow.
An explosion can occur in two ways:  Gas is released prior to isolation valve, when the leak is detected, the isolation valve works but the pressure relief valve fails.  Gas is released after isolation valve, when the leak is detected, the isolation valve fails and the ignition source occurs.
A fault tree representing causes of an ignition following a gas release is shown in Figure 2 . Working in a bottom-up way the following logic expression is obtained.
, where "+" is OR, " " is AND.
are prime implicants, as combinations of component conditions (working or failed) which are necessary and sufficient to cause system failure.
Also, unlike the reduction of the logic expression for a coherent fault tree the logic Equation for the top event in the non-coherent case does not produce a complete list of all prime implicants. In this example, there is one more failure mode:
i.e. if a leak occurs and the pressure relief valve has failed and an ignition source is present on the section after the isolation valve it does not matter if the isolation valve closes or not, an ignition of the gas release will occur.
Therefore, the full logic expression for the Top event is:
which can be obtained by applying the consensus law:
. There are usually considerably more prime implicant sets than there are minimal cut sets for a coherent representation. Also the prime implicant sets tend to be a larger order (number of elements in a set) than the minimal cut sets. The increase in length of the logic Equation can cause difficulties for large fault trees. A coherent approximation can be obtained by assuming that all working states are TRUE, i.e. the probability of a component working is very close to 1. In the example shown in Ignition following gas release
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Conversion to BDDs
Binary Decision Diagrams can be used for the accurate quantification of fault trees. They do not need to evaluate the prime implicant sets as an intermediate step and do not need approximations. These advantages are critical when analysing non-coherent fault trees and overcome the difficulties encountered with conventional fault tree theory. To utilise the method, the fault tree is converted to a binary decision diagram, representing the structure function SFBDD.
Before the fault tree is converted to a BDD, the fault tree is manipulated so that the NOT logic is "pushed" down the fault tree until it is applied to basic events by using De Morgan's laws, i.e.
Each vertex in a SFBDD has an ite (if-then-else) structure. To illustrate this consider the ite structure ite(x, f 1 , f 0 ), which means that if x fails then consider function f 1 , else consider function f 0 . Also, f 1 lies on the 1 branch of x and f 0 lies on the 0 branch.
Constructing the SFBDD from a fault tree initially requires the basic events in the fault tree to be given an ordering. SFBDD construction then moves through the fault tree in a bottom-up manner.  Each basic event is assigned an ite structure a = ite(a,1,0). (9)  Alternatively, a basic event a is assigned an ite structure: a = ite(a,0,1).
(10)
 Dealing with gate inputs:
If J = ite(x,f 1 , f 0 ) and H = ite(y,g 1 , g 0 ) represent two inputs to a gate of logic type
For small examples the variable ordering is largely irrelevant. Variable ordering schemes are discussed in [12, 13] . Consider the variable ordering scheme L < VAL < PRV < I1. Applying the conversion rules (9)- (11) to the fault tree in Figure 2 results in a SFBDD presented in Figure 3 . Figure 3 . SFBDD for the fault tree in Figure 2 
Calculation of prime implicant sets
In addition to quantification of the top event, knowledge of prime implicant sets can be valuable in gaining an understanding of the system. It can help to develop a repair schedule for failed components if a system cannot be taken off line for repair. The SFBDD which encodes the structure function cannot be used directly to produce the complete list of prime implicant sets of a non-coherent fault tree.
For example, consider a general component x in a non-coherent system. In a prime implicant a component x can appear in a failed or working state, or can be excluded from the failure mode. In the first two situations x is said to be relevant, in the third case it is irrelevant to the system state. Component x can be either failure relevant (the prime implicant set contains x) or repair relevant (the prime implicant set contains x ). A general node in the SFBDD, which represents component x, has two branches. The 1 branch corresponds to the failure of x; therefore, x is either failure relevant or irrelevant. Similarly, the 0 branch corresponds to the functioning of x and so x is either repair relevant or irrelevant. Hence it is impossible to distinguish between the two cases for each branch and the prime implicant sets cannot be identified directly from the BDD.
Ternary Decision Diagram method
A method to use a ternary decision diagram (TDD) in order to compute the prime implicant sets of a non-coherent fault tree structure is proposed in this section. It employs the consensus theorem and creates, in addition to the two branches of the BDD, a third branch for every node, called the consensus branch. This third branch encodes the "hidden" prime implicant sets. The minimisation algorithm [1] is applied to remove non-minimal paths.
Conversion of fault trees to TDDs
The TDD representation features a node structure with three exit branches. A new ifre structure is presented which distinguishes not only between relevant and irrelevant components but also it distinguishes between the type of relevancy, i.e. failure relevant and repair relevant. The ifre structure for a node x is given in Figure 4 . So if:
then
Figure 4. ifre structure
The 1 branch encodes prime implicant sets for which component x is failure relevant, the 0 branch encodes prime implicant sets for which component x is repair relevant, and the "C" branch encodes prime implicant sets for which component x is irrelevant. The ifre structure shown in Figure 4 can be interpreted as follows: Function f 2 represents prime implicant sets for which x is irrelevant, i.e. neither failure nor repair relevant combinations. The "C" branch is not obtained for all components. Therefore, this branch can be kept "empty" for components that are only failure or repair relevant but not both. If the conjunction of the two branches f 1 f 0 is not required, f 2 = NIL. Symbol NIL identifies cases when the "C" branch is not required and no Boolean operations that involve this branch are needed. When operating the new symbol in the Boolean algebra, it is defined that NIL  A= NIL.
The conversion process for computing the TDD from the non-coherent fault tree is an extension to the method used to develop the conventional BDD. Basic events of the fault tree must be ordered. Then the following process is presented:  By the application of De Morgan's laws push any NOT gates down through the fault tree until it reaches a basic event level.  Each basic event is assigned an ifre structure.
If a is only failure or repair relevant: a = ifre(a,1,0,NIL), 
If component x is failure or repair relevant,
Within each ifre calculation an additional consensus calculation is performed to ensure all the "hidden" prime implicant sets are encoded in the TDD. It calculates the product of the 1 and the 0 branch of every node and thus identifies the consensus of each node.
Consider the fault tree in Figure 2 . Introducing the ordering of basic events L < VAL < PRV < I1 and applying the rules described in Equations (15)- (19) gives the TDD in Figure 5 . It can be seen that the TDD in Figure 5 is different from the SFBDD in Figure 3 only with its "C" branch that represents the intersection of the 1 and 0 branches. Only for node F2 a new structure F5 is created. The other nodes have the "C" branch leading to value NIL, since they encode variables that only appear as failure or repair relevant To obtain prime implicant sets non-minimal combinations from every path need to be removed. 
Minimisation of TDDs
Once the TDD has been computed there is no guarantee that the resulting structure will be minimal, i.e. produce the prime implicant sets exactly. In order to perform the qualitative analysis a minimisation procedure needs to be implemented.
The algorithm developed by Rauzy for minimising the BDD [1] can be extended to create a minimal consensus TDD that encodes only the prime implicant sets.
Consider a general node in the TDD which is represented by the function F, where F = ifre(x, G, H, K).
(20) Since there are three types of variables in the TDD (failure relevant, repair relevant and both), the minimisation process is described for these three cases. The set sol min (F) represents the minimal solutions of F by removing any minimal solutions of H that are also minimal solutions of G.
Case 3 -x is failure and repair relevant
The set of all the minimal solutions of F is given as:
The set sol min (F) represents the minimal solutions of F by removing any minimal solutions of G and H that are also minimal solutions of K.
Obtaining prime implicant sets from TDDs
The identification of prime implicant sets depends on the relevance of the node in the three cases, as it was given in the section above.
Case 1
Traversing the 1 branch of node x results in a failed state of a component in a particular failure mode. Traversing the 0 branch of node x does not include that component in a particular failure mode.
Case 2
Traversing the 0 branch of node x results in a repaired state of a component in a particular failure mode. Traversing the 1 branch of node x does not include that component in a particular failure mode.
Case 3
Traversing the 1 branch of node x results in a failed state of a component in a particular failure mode. Traversing the 0 branch of node x results in a working state of a component in a particular failure mode. Finally, traversing the "C" branch of node x does not include that component in a particular failure mode at all Traversing the TDD in Figure 5 from the root vertex to terminal vertices 1 gives three prime implicant sets.
The TDD method provides a good alternative technique for performing the qualitative analysis for non-coherent fault trees.
Established methods
This section presents the existing methods for converting non-coherent fault trees to BDDs and obtaining prime implicant sets. In the later section the efficiency of all methods, including the TDD method, will be investigated and compared using some example fault trees.
Meta-products BDD method
This method converts a SFBDD to a meta-products BDD which produces all prime implicant sets. A meta-products BDD obtained is in its minimal form.
4.2.1.1.Conversion of SFBDDs to meta-products BDDs
An alternative notation was developed in [6, 7] that associates two variables with every component x. The first variable, P x , denotes relevancy and the second variable, S x , denotes the type of relevancy, i.e. failure or repair relevant. A meta-product, MP( ), is the intersection of all the system components according to their relevancy to the system state and represents the prime implicant set encoded in meta-product MP( ). The proposed algorithm by Dutuit and Rauzy [7] is used for calculating the metaproducts BDD of a fault tree from the BDD. The meta-products BDD is always minimal, therefore it encodes the prime implicant sets exactly.
In order to present the algorithm, consider node F in a SFBDD, where F = ite(x, F1, F0). The meta-products BDD, that describes prime implicant sets using Equation (24), is expressed as:
PI(F) = ite(P x , ite(S x , P1, P0), P2),
x is the first element in the variable ordering, PI(F) represents the structure of a metaproducts BDD, PI is used to denote the prime implicants.
P2 encodes the prime implicants for which x is irrelevant, P1 encodes the prime implicants for which x is failure relevant and P0 encodes the prime implicants for which x is repair relevant.
If not all the basic events in the variable ordering appear on the particular path, then
here x j is before x i and x j does not appear on the current path from the root node to node F.
If F is a terminal node, then
PI ( Since there are no repeated parts between PI(F3) and  
The same simplification is applied to PI(F4) and
The resulting meta-products BDD for the BDD in Figure 3 is shown in Figure 6 .
4.2.1.2.Obtaining prime implicant sets
Now it is possible to obtain the meta-products and identify the prime implicant sets. Every path from the root node to a terminal 1 gives a prime implicant set.
For example, in the first meta-product P L signifies that component L is relevant and S L signifies that component L is failure relevant. The same with components VAL and I1.
PRV P means that component PRV is irrelevant. Hence the prime implicant set obtained is {L, VAL, I1}.
The number of nodes in a meta-products BDD increases largely since every basic event x is presented by two nodes, P x and S x . The process can be time-consuming. 
ZBDD method
An alternative method presented by Rauzy in [9] uses the idea of zero-suppressed BDDs (ZBDD) introduced by Minato in [10] . The method requires to label nodes with failed and/or working states of basic events and to decompose prime implicant sets according to the presence of a given state of a basic event.
4.2.2.1.Zero-Suppressed BDDs
Zero-suppressed BDDs are BDDs based on a reduction rule. This data structure provides a unique and compact representation which is more efficient and simpler than the usual BDDs when manipulating sets in combinatorial problems. The following reduction rules for BDDs are applied:
 Eliminate all the nodes that have the 1 branch pointing to terminal vertex 0. Then connect the branch that was pointing to the eliminated node to the BDD structure beneath the 0 branch of the eliminated node as shown in Figure 7 .  Share all equivalent BDD structures as for original BDDs. 
4.2.2.2.Decomposition rule
The principle of this algorithm is to traverse the SFBDD that encodes structure function  = ite(x, f 1 , f 0 ) in a depth-first way and to build a ZBDD that encodes the prime implicant sets of  in a bottom-up way.
The rule is divided in four cases:
Case 1: if basic event x appears in its failed and working states then
S 0 = PI( f 0 ) \ S 2 .
(35) Here "\" is operator without [1] that is used minimising conventional BDDs. 
where The resulting ZBDDs retain the variable ordering from the SFBDD. In addition, working states of basic events that appear in both states are incorporated in the ordering scheme, i.e. they appear after the basic event in its failed state in the ordering scheme.
4.2.2.3.ZBDD Example
Consider the SFBDD in Figure 3 . Introduce the variable ordering for the ZBDD method L < VAL < VAL < PVR < I1. Applying the rules described in Equations (32)- (39) gives the ZBDD in Figure 8 .
Each node is considered in the bottom-up way. After the last substitution we obtain: PI(F1) = ite(L, ite(VAL, ite(I1, 1, 0), ite(VAL , ite(PRV, 1, 0), ite(PRV, ite(I1, 1, 0), 0))), 0).
The ZBDD in Figure 8 is different form the SFBDD in Figure 3 because it has an additional variable VAL that indicates prime implicant sets that contain VAL . Figure 8 . The ZBDD for the SFBDD in Figure 3 Every path from the root vertex to terminal vertex 1 presents a prime implicant set. Therefore, this ZBDD contains three prime implicant sets:
The ZBDD is an efficient technique where all prime implicant sets are described by a compact and easy handling structure.
Labelled variable method
The labelled variable method [11] provides another alternative method for constructing BDDs for non-coherent fault trees. BDDs constructed using this conversion approach consist of variables that are labelled according to their type. They are called labelled binary decision diagrams (L-BDDs).
The background for this method is that the current analysis algorithms consider the fault tree structure as a Boolean function in which all variables have the same properties, whereas the operations to be applied to determine the prime implicant sets are dependent on the variables' type. For example, variables that appear in their failure and success states can appear in combinations of events which lead to system failure in both states, and which are not covered by the SFBDD obtained. In the L-BDD method it is convenient to consider this additional information about the type of a variable during the conversion process itself. The aim of the L-BDD method is to construct and analyse a L-BDD in which all variables are labelled with their type. In the further presentation the SFP variable x will be simply presented by x, the SFN variable x will be labelled as "$x" and the DF variable x will be labelled as "&x".
The conversion process for computing the L-BDD from the non-coherent fault tree is an extension to the method used to develop the SFBDD. Basic events of the fault tree must be ordered. Then the following process is performed:
 By the application of De Morgan's laws push any NOT gates down through the fault tree until it reaches a basic event level.  Each basic event is assigned an ite structure as in Equation (9) or Equation (10) .  Traversing the fault tree in a bottom-up manner and considering gates whose inputs have been expressed in an ite format using Equation (11) .
The last rule Equation (11) of this algorithm is extended presenting some additional rules that incorporate labelled variables.  Considering the ordering &x < x < $x implements the following Equations:
If J = ite(x,f 1 , f 0 ) and H = ite($x,g 1 , g 0 ),
If J = ite(&x,f 1 , f 0 ) and H = ite(x,g 1 , g 0 ),
If J = ite(&x,f 1 , f 0 ) and H = ite($x,g 1 ,g 0 ),
Applying the conversion rules given in Equations (9)- (11) and Equations (40)- (42) to the fault tree in Figure 2 results in a L-BDD presented in Figure 9 . The variable ordering is L < VAL < PRV < I1. The resulting L-BDD is equivalent to its SFBDD in Figure 3 , if DF variable "&VAL" is replaced by variable VAL. The L-BDD does not provide all the information for the qualitative analysis, therefore some additional calculations are performed in order to get all prime implicant sets.
4.2.3.2.Simplification of L-BDD
The most complex rules of the qualitative analysis of the L-BDD are applied to nodes with DF variables. Therefore, it is convenient to reduce the number of DF variables before calculating prime implicant sets. The rules are applied on the parts of the L-BDD that have a terminal vertex. Simplification rules are shown in Figure 10 . The example L-BDD in Figure 9 is in its simplest form, therefore the simplification rules are not applied.
4.2.3.3.Obtaining prime implicant sets from L-BDD
Let structure function  be: Consider the L-BDD shown in Figure 9 . Prime implicant sets can be calculated using Equations (46)-(49).
Since the variable of node F2 is a DF variable, i.e. it appears in the fault tree in both success and failure states, the intersection of its 1 and 0 branches is calculated in order to get all prime implicant sets. This process is similar to the calculation of the "C" branch in the TDD method. The L-BDD method provides an efficient technique that allows to calculate prime implicant sets using the prior information about the type of every variable.
Quantitative analysis of non-coherent

5.1.Quantification of a non-coherent system using the TDD
In order to perform the quantitative analysis for non-coherent fault trees using the BDD method, a non-coherent fault tree is converted to a SFBDD that represents the structure function of the fault tree. In the TDD method the non-coherent fault tree is converted to the TDD that has three branches from each node. The third branch is created to encode all prime implicants of the system. However, the TDD can be used not only for the qualitative analysis but also for the quantitative analysis.
Consider node F in the TDD, F = ifre(x, f 1 , f 0 , f 1 f 0 ). The structure function ) (x  was expressed in (13), i.e.
Using the pivotal decomposition to the structure function of order n it is possible to express it in terms of structure functions that are of order n-1. Pivoting ) (x  about variable x and applying the absorption law to Equation 35 gives:
Then the expectation of ) (x  is obtained and the top event probability is calculated:
Therefore, the probability of the top event, Q SYS , is the sum of the probabilities of the disjoint paths through the TDD. The disjoint paths, that are taken into account, can be found by tracing all paths from the root vertex via the 1 and 0 branches to terminal 1 vertices. The disjoint paths via the "C" branch are not included in the quantification process.
If the quantitative analysis is required as well as the qualitative analysis, the TDD before the minimisation can be used for the quantification process. Additional calculations for obtaining the SFBDD are not required.
5.2.Quantitative analysis using other methods
Consider a node F in the SFBDD, F = ite(x, f 1 , f 0 ). The structure function ) (x  is expressed as
, which is adequate to the expression in (50). Therefore, the probability of the top event, Q SYS , is obtained as a sum of probabilities of the disjoint paths through the SFBDD. Quantitative analysis is performed in this way applying the meta-products BDD method and the ZBDD method, where the SFBDD is obtained after fault tree conversion prior to the qualitative analysis.
In the L-BDD method the quantitative analysis is adequate, i.e. the probability of the top event, Q SYS , is the sum of the probabilities of the disjoint paths through the L-BDD. In this case each variable &x is treated as x, and $x -as x .
Comparison of the four methods
The theoretical comparison of the four different techniques is provided in Table 1 gives a short overview of all four construction techniques. It highlights the main advantages and disadvantages of the four approaches. The TDD method provides a clear and efficient representation of prime implicant sets when the "C" branch for a node is created if needed. Also, using the ZBDD a compact representation of prime implicant sets is obtained which does not require the minimisation process. The least favourable technique is the meta-products BDD method where two variables are assigned for every basic event. Due to this feature the size of the BDD and the processing time is increased unavoidably.
The efficiency of the four methods for calculating prime implicant sets was investigated using a benchmark of medium sized fault trees from industry. The performance over 13 example fault trees was obtained, since each method may perform well on some fault trees dependent upon the fault tree structure. The complexity of the 13 fault trees is indicated in columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2 , representing the number of gates, the number of events and the number of prime implicant sets in their solution.
The number of nodes using the TDD method, the meta-products BDD method, the ZBDD method and the L-BDD method are presented in columns 5, 6, 7 and 8 respectively. The number of nodes in the TDD method describes the sum of the number of nodes in the TDD before the minimisation and the number of nodes in the TDD after the minimisation. The number of nodes for the second method covers the number of nodes in the SFBDD and the meta-products BDD. For the ZBDD method the number of nodes in the SFBDD and the number of nodes in the ZBDD is given. The number of nodes in the L-BDD method contains the sum of the number of nodes in the L-BDD before applying the minimisation and the number of nodes in the minimised L-BDD.
